ABSTRACT. Liquidity is a key resource that banks have to manage on a daily basis. Large banking groups face the question of how to optimally allocate and generate liquidity: in a central liquidity hub or in many decentralized branches across different time zones, jurisdictions, and FX zones. We rephrase the question as a facility-location problem under uncertainty. We show that volatility is a key driver of the degree of (de-)centralization. As expected, in a deterministic setup liquidity should be managed centrally in the most profitable branch. However, under stochastic liquidity demand and different time zones, FX zones, and jurisdictions we find that liquidity is preferably managed and generated in a decentralized fashion to a certain extend. We provide an analytical solution for the 2-branch model. In our setup, a liquidity center is an option on immediate liquidity. Therefore, its value can be interpreted as the "price of information", i.e. the price of knowing the demand. Furthermore, we derive the threshold to open a liquidity center and show that it is a function of the volatility and the characteristic of the bank network. Finally, we discuss the n-branch model for real-world banking groups (n = 10 to 60 branches) and show that it can be solved with high granularity (100 scenarios) within less than 30 seconds.
INTRODUCTION
We study how a large banking group should organize its liquidity management. Such a banking group has many branches in various time zones, jurisdictions and FX-zones. Each branch faces a stochastic liquidity demand driven by customer behavior. We ask whether such a group should run one global liquidity center, a set of regional ones or many local ones?
Liquidity management in general and its organization in particular are of utmost importance since the financial crisis 2007/-09 that started as liquidity crisis and rose doubts on the soundness of the liquidity management of many banks. During the crisis the transferability of liquidity across FX-zones and jurisdictions was reduced (see [5, p. 13] ). An issue that particularly globally operating banking groups face and that our model addresses.
Banks and liquidity are two closely related concepts: Both exist because of information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers. Banks internalize these asymmetries by producing illiquid assets (loans) that they keep on their balance sheet. Often these assets are funded by liquid deposits. The arising liquidity mismatch exposes the banks to liquidity risk. Hence managing liquidity is a core activity of banks.
Research on banks' liquidity management is as old as banks. Nevertheless, we are not aware of a paper that has already addressed the organizational setup of liquidity production in a banking group. Many papers model the bank as a nucleus that interacts with outsiders as customers, banks or regulators. By contrast, our paper drills down in the nucleus splitting it up into a set of branches.
To identify the related literature, we outline our model setup.
In each of the n branches of a globally operating banking group, clients unexpectedly deposit and withdraw funds leading to a stochastic liquidity demand (Assumption 1). Intraday, the demand can be satisfied via the central bank account. However, at the end of the day the account must be cleared. Liquidity demand can be covered by liquidity production. We consider the cases of producing liquidity locally in a given branch itself or remotely in a different branch. In the latter case additional costs for the transfer are incurred (Assumption 2). Each branch can run a specialized department (treasury/liquidity center) that produces liquidity at the local interbank market. In that case, we say that the branch is a "liquidity center". Without the specialized department, the branch can only raise funds at the central bank (Assumption 3). In that case, we say that the branch is a "non liquidity center". We assume that interbank funds are substantially cheaper than the central bank funds (Assumption 4). Establishing a liquidity center requires an investment in staff and infrastructure which incurs a fixed cost. A further complication is added by a time component. We assume that the remotely produced liquidity is not immediately available, but only with a certain delay motivated by the fact that executing a remote liquidity request takes time (Assumption 5). The locally produced liquidity though is immediately available as no transfer and legal clearance is required. Hence, a liquidity center is an option on cheap and immediate (interbank) liquidity. We further assume that in a first step, the board can only decide once upon the liquidity centers and this decision is then assumed to be non-revisable for the considered time horizon. The model has one production/transportation period under stochastic demand.
Hence, our paper is naturally related to the literature on (i) how banks manage liquidity, (ii) how they transfer it between branches and (iii) how facilities (liquidity centers) should be allocated (facility-location literature). The gap between incoming and outgoing cash flows is the so called liquidity gap. In reality, the liquidity gap appears as a negative balance on the central bank account. The liquidity gap is the challenge of liquidity management as it is a stochastic quantity driven by customer behavior. The variable in our model that corresponds to the liquidity gap is the liquidity demand. It is the stochastic driver of our model (see Assumption 1) .
The gap (central bank account) must be closed (cleared) at the end of each day by additionally produced liquidity. Liquidity can be produced in two ways:
(1) Liquidation of assets: Liquid assets are sold on the market in order to generate liquidity.
(2) Raising external funds: Banks seek out to obtain liquidity from other banks or the central bank. Producing liquidity through any one of these channels involves cost -the haircut in case of liquidation and credit spread in case of raising external funds. Our model does not differentiate between the two channels as we do not want to optimize across instruments. The literature on liquidity management gravitates around the stochastic liquidity gap. The distribution of the gap discusses [38] . Based on a data set of German Schmidt-Bank, the normality assumption is rejected and a tailed distribution is proposed instead. Our real-world model (Section 3) uses a scenario approach, i.e., any empirical distribution can be implemented. In a simplified 2-branch model, we assume a normally distributed liquidity demand for analytical tractability (Section 2). Regulatory publications (see [9, 6] ) discuss approaches to identify and measure the risk of the liquidity gap and the adequate size of risk buffers. In our model, liquidity buffers are implicitly considered if liquidity production is carried out remotely before the liquidity demand realizes. Papers that study the optimal instrument mix to manage the liquidity gaps are [23] and [18] . They present deterministic programming models that determine a mix on money market instruments that maximizes expected profit. Stochastic programming is also used in the context of liquidity management. Such an approach for the optimal management of (independent) cash flow shocks using short-term funds and investments has been presented in [33] and [17] . With these papers we share the assumption of a stochastic liquidity demand. Empirical studies on bank's liquidity management are rare as many liquidity variables are not publicly available. How banks react (using liquidity instruments) to externally changed conditions is studied in [36] . The (empirical) role of loan sales and purchases as a new liquidity management instrument is analyzed by [10] . Liquidity is produced on the money market. As the money market is of systemic importance for the banking sector the study of its robustness is an active research field. The authors of [28] provide an extensive survey of the money market literature and compile sources of market failures and the appropriate regulatory preventive actions. However, this literature is only of secondary importance for our paper as we assume a smooth functioning of the money market. The money market can be further split up into interbank and central bank market. We assume that the liquidity production on the central bank market is more expensive than on the interbank market (see Assumption 4) . In general, the deposit rates of the central bank floor, the lending rates cap the interbank market. Furthermore, we make the assumption that only specialized departments, i.e., liquidity centers, can trade on the interbank market. Standard branches have only access to expensive central bank liquidity (see Assumption 3) .
Liquidity is transferred between branches using payment systems. The payment systems in place are real-time gross settlement systems (RTGS). Their name-providing features are that the payments are irrevocably settled real-time and on an order-by-order basis. In fact, Target2, the payment system of the Eurosystem settles 99,81% of the payments within 5 minutes (see [15, p.21,60] ). A review of the academic literature on payment systems can be found in [11] . A discussion from a practitioner's point of view on the evolution, current situation and challenges of payment systems can be found in [13] . There is a rich literature on the robustness of payment systems (see [22] , [24] , [26] , [32] , [21] and [25] ). However, this literature is secondary for our paper as we assume the smooth functioning of payment systems. With respect to payment systems we make two assumptions: first, we assume that the transfer incurs (transportation) cost (see Assumption 2) . Second, we assume that the transfer takes time (see Assumption 5) . As mentioned, the bulk of payments is settled within (negligible) 5 minutes. However, our transfer time comprises all the time between observing a liquidity need, ordering liquidity in a remote branch and producing, transferring, settling the liquidity in the initial branch. Transfer cost comprise FX-conversion cost and any losses due to cross-border transactions (tax, corruption). In a recent paper [3] study the FX-conversion cost in the light of the financial crisis. The assumption on the delay is an expert judgement as we are not aware of an empirical paper that discusses time aspects for liquidity production in banks.
The facility location literature is the third stream that is relevant to our paper as our model is a facility location model. Facility location models optimize the locations across a network considering future production and transportation. In our case, we optimize the allocation of liquidity centers across a branch network considering the future production and transfer of liquidity. The literature on this field is broad 1 . To identify the streams that are relevant for our work, it is necessary to situate our model within the classification used in the literature. Following [12] , our model is a discrete static stochastic facility location model. It is discrete, because liquidity centers cannot be opened everywhere but only in (given) branches. It is static as the board can only decide once on liquidity centers. In particular, it cannot revise its decision. It is stochastic as the distribution of our stochastic variable (liquidity demand) is known. Extensive literature reviews of stochastic facility location models can be found in [35] and [30] . So far we specified the macro structure of the model. However, the solving method depends on the micro structure of the problem, i.e., the structure of the objective function and constraints. We minimize expected cost although risk measures could be used instead or the objective function could be augmented by a (weighted) risk measure to include risk aversion. Our constraints are linear. The uncertainty lies in the state variable liquidity demand. The solving of stochastic models requires two steps: first, the conversion of the stochastic optimization problem into a deterministic one and second, the application of well-known algorithms (depending on objective, parameter and variable structure) to solve the deterministic model. For the first step we use a scenario planning approach as discussed in [12] and [27, p. 75] . We then solve this problem using a mixed integer linear programming approach in a second step. Despite the numerous applications of facility location models to, e.g., Airline hubs, blood banks, day-care centers, fire stations (cf. [31] , [8] , [12] and references contained therein), this article is the first one, to the authors' best knowledge, to apply the theory to the location of liquidity centers within a banking organization. The spirit of our application is similar to [4] that set up a location model with random demand and penalty cost for under-and overproduction. However, our model is motivated by the principle of valuing liquidity centers as options. A model for the location of international facilities incorporating exchange risk has been presented by [37] .
A word on regulation. Banking is a highly regulated industry. In particular, we assume that regulators do not prescribe the treasury setup of a large banking group. However, recent publications indicate that regulators might want to have a tighter control over the organizational treasury setup of banks and thus in the future requirements on the liquidity setup might be postulated by regulators. In this case the optimal location of liquidity centers might be exogenously biased.
Main results. Our model is based on two main assumptions:
(1) Transferring liquidity from one branch to another incurs a certain time delay (Assumption 2). (2) Having set up a liquidity center reduces liquidity production cost (Assumption 5).
Clearly, these assumptions are very mild and reflect minimal requirements and facts about producing and transferring liquidity. Our analysis proceeds in three steps: 1-branch model, 2-branch model and n-branch model.
We confirm the traditional trade-off between fixed cost and volume (in form of expected demand) for the 1-branch model. This would still hold for the 2-branch setup, if remotely produced liquidity was immediately available. The assumption of a time delay introduces an information advantage for liquidity centers: liquidity can not only be produced cheaper (on the interbank market), but also after knowing the realized liquidity demand. This avoids any penalty cost of under-/ overproduction. We show that even nodes with an absolute comparative disadvantage in producing liquidity might be set up as liquidity centers in order to reduce emergency liquidity cost. As part of our analysis we derive a price for the information on the exact demand in a branch. Thus, the liquidity center can be interpreted as an option on cheap and immediate liquidity. In that spirit, the option price (= reduced cost) of a liquidity center is identical to the price of information. We see that the network cost structure is supermodular, the law of diminishing returns holds and so the price of information depends on the liquidity center locations already put in place (see Section 2.1). The price of information constitutes indeed a volume independent price of a risk that cannot be hedged or eliminated (except for setting up a liquidity center in the considered branch); a basis risk in that setting. The price of information implies a threshold volatility: a liquidity center is economically advantageous if the demand volatility is larger than this threshold and vice versa.
The n-branch model is formulated as an optimization problem which implicitly values the (liquidity center) options and determines the optimal allocation of liquidity centers. The marginal prices of information, i.e., the option prices can be recovered using this approach (see Section 3.4). The model presented in Section 3.2 is scenario based in order to allow for the inclusion of highly unlikely stress test scenarios and correlation effects. In Section 4 we present a deterministic model for the special case of normally distributed independent demands. Stochasticity in this case is directly incorporated via the price of information. We show computational feasibility for both models, even for large branch networks.
Throughout the exposition we assume that the bank aims for expected cost minimization in accordance with shareholder value maximization but we would like to stress that risk measures such as value-at-risk or expected shortfall can be easily incorporated into the model using the approach presented in [7] .
The outline of the article is as follows. Section 2 discusses the problem of managing liquidity in general and formulates necessary assumptions and constraints for locating liquidity centers. We will then derive the analytical characterization for the 1-branch and 2-branch models. Section 3 extends the 2-branch to a n-branch model that is formulated as a network flow problem with a certain facility location characteristic. In order to do so we first introduce the necessary notions and recall some basic facts. Then we transform the liquidity center location problem into a corresponding mixed integer linear program and provide an economic interpretation of the dual variables and the reduced costs in the context of our location problem. Section 4 shows how the scenario-based model of section 3 can be reformulated as deterministic optimization problem for normally distributed liquidity demands. Section 5 applies the models to show the effects of volatility and computational feasibility for realworld banking groups. Section 6 concludes.
MANAGING LIQUIDITY
We stated that a bank is liquid if no central bank account has a negative balance at the end of the day. This implies that a bank has to manage the liquidity demand for each central bank account on a daily basis. In particular, each central bank account is exposed to a stochastic liquidity demand that the bank must cover by generating additional liquidity. Liquidity can be produced at the interbank market by specialized departments, called liquidity centers, or at the central bank by any branch.
The advantages of a liquidity center are many-fold:
Branches running a liquidity center can produce liquidity cheaper. A branch that runs a liquidity center can produce liquidity cheaper as compared to the case where no center has been set up. We assume that a liquidity center regularly accesses local markets leading to lower production costs. Without a liquidity center, the infrastructure (knowledge, systems) does not allow to access the interbank market, but only the central bank at elevated rates (i.e., emergency rates). The access to local markets generates contacts and reduces the time and cost to produce liquidity.
Locally produced liquidity is instantaneously available. Liquidity produced in the branch itself can immediately be used. If liquidity was produced remotely in a different liquidity center, there is a substantial time delay between the initiation of the liquidity production and the final settlement. This delay arises from the operational steps that have to be performed to produce liquidity remotely. In our setup, the network graph models the delay via the edge structure. The further introduction of different time zones disperses branches on the (absolute) time scale. In particular, it shifts opening and closing of branches and restricts the time that one branch can request a liquidity production in another branch. However, this is only relevant for the intraday production of expected liquidity as the end-of-day liquidity shortage (unexpected liquidity demand) can only be locally produced. A remote production requested end-of-day would be settled too late to cover the central bank account of the requesting branch. Time zones therefore reduce the effective time window for production of expected liquidity demand, but do not affect the decisions that depend on unexpected liquidity demand. We account for that by assigning time zones to branches.
Production of liquidity in the same currency as the demand. A liquidity center can produce liquidity in the same currency as the liquidity demand of that branch. The production in another branch and the subsequent transfer would require the conversion into the currency of the destination branch. The conversion could be costly due to elevated FX-rates or convertibility limits. In our setup, conversion cost are part of the transportation cost.
Local production avoids operational risks and different jurisdictions. The local production avoids all operational risks related to the transfer of liquidity. The transfer is sensitive to disruptions of the payment system and errors in account details and amounts, and other country risk related issues. Additionally, we might face restrictions on the transfer of funds due to different jurisdictions. The operational risk could be reduced by limiting the demand that can be remotely produced. Our model incorporates such limits.
A remote production is only favorable if the remote branch has a comparative advantage in liquidity production. One might think of economies of scale (volume) and scope (reduction in operational risk due to frequent market accesses) that constitute comparative advantages.
A large banking group faces the problem of how to organize its liquidity production. Which setup is optimal: one global liquidity center, a set of centers, or many local centers optimal? And which branches should be upgraded to a liquidity center? We assume that the optimal setup is the one that minimizes expected overall production cost which is in accordance with shareholder value maximization. After having provided the economic rationale, we formalize the optimization problem starting with the 1-branch model. 1-branch model. Let Q denote the set of scenarios that we consider. A bank is liquid if its incoming cash flows (C F + ) cover its outgoing cash flows (C F − ) end-of-day in each scenario q:
Note that these cash flows result from customer products, i.e., they are driven by customer behavior. An alternative formulation of (2.2) after netting the customer cash flows (cf. 
We consider stochastic liquidity demand and thus d q might vary with the scenarios q ∈ Q. Due to banks' liquidity strategies, the demand is usually positive in the short-and negative in the long-run. Therefore, liquidity management has to produce liquidity x in the short-run to cover the demand, i.e.,
Producing liquidity incurs a cost of c A for each unit of liquidity for a liquidity center and of c N for a nonliquidity center. A liquidity center produces liquidity using a variety of instruments on the interbank market. A non-liquidity center can only raise emergency liquidity at elevated cost at the central bank. We assume that the liquidity production on the interbank market is cheaper than with the central bank (c A < c N ) . The downside of a liquidity center are the required fixed cost in staff, systems and rents.
We assume that shareholders require the minimization of expected cost. One obtains (2.3) if the bank runs a liquidity center min
In the optimization problems (2.3) and (2.4), expected cost are minimized at the production volume x q * = d (second stage decision). Minimizing across (2.3) and (2.4) leads to the following decision rule (first stage decision): a liquidity center is favorable, if it holds:
where [.] denotes the expected value. FIGURE 2.2. Basic sets/structure for the 2-branch model Equation (2.5) confirms the classical trade-off between fixed cost and the savings on variable (production) cost for the 1-branch model. The driving factor whether to run a liquidity center is the expected demand. Volatility aspects do not matter because a liquidity center does not provide any informational advantage. Please note that the second-stage decision is a deterministic one as liquidity can be produced after the demand realizes.
2-branch model. The situation gets significantly more complicated if we consider different branches of a large banking group and the possibility to have several liquidity centers. In order to keep analytical tractability, we extend (2.1) to two branches in a first step. The introduction of a second branch requires the following model adjustments:
(1) Definition of basis sets: branches, nodes, graph (2) Node-specific variables and parameters (3) Assumptions on liquidity transport As the n-branch model will be structurally identical, we introduce the notation for the n-branch model and specify the 2-branch model as particular case.
Definition of basis sets: branches, nodes, graph. B is the set of all location/ branches. For our 2-branch model, we set B := {T, F } corresponding to Tokyo and Frankfurt. In liquidity management, time matters as the liquidity condition has to be fulfilled before central banks close. In order to capture the critical dimension "time", we define a discrete (world) time grid T := {0, 6, 12, 18, 24} and extend the branch set to a time-expended set of nodes V ⊆ B × T . Hence, a node is a (branch, time) pair that describes the availability of a branch on the (world) time scale. For our 2-branch model, we consider that Tokyo is available from 0 to 12 and Frankfurt from 6 to 18 leading to the node set (2.6):
The availability of branches and the node definition are depicted in Figure 2 .
(branches and node definition).
Node-specific variables and parameters. In the case of multiple branches, we do not have a single aggregated demand but a liquidity demand d q (v) for each node v ∈ V and each scenario q ∈ Q . Furthermore, every node can produce liquidity x q (v). As in the 1-branch model, the cost depend on the status (center/ non-center), but also on the node itself. This models the differences across financial markets: it is likely that Tokyo might never be able to produce liquidity as cheap as Frankfurt even by opening a liquidity center. Hence, setting up Tokyo as liquidity center reduces production cost only locally (from having to pay the central bank rate to paying the interbank one). The production cost are defined to be:
, v is not a liquidity center.
For our 2-branch model, we have
Assumptions on liquidity transport. Liquidity can be transported across branches. Hence, our node set extends to a time-expended liquidity network graph G := (V, E) as displayed in Figure 2 .2. Allowing for liquidity flows across branches, the liquidity constraint for every node v ∈ V extends to the following flow inequality
i.e., the locally produced liquidity x q (v) plus the in-flow of liquidity from other locations inflow q (v) minus the out-flow of liquidity into other locations outflow q (v) must satisfy the demand d q (v). With respect to liquidity transport, we make two assumptions:
(1) For every edge (v, w) ∈ E we have transfer costs or storage costs t(v, w) ∈ + depending on v, w being the same branch or different branches. Transfer cost account for cost incurred to convert from currency of branch v to the currency of branch w and for non-contractual reductions, e.g., by corruption. (see also Assumption 2) (2) Remote liquidity production exhibits a time delay. The time delay covers the gross time between identifying a liquidity demand, communicating it to the other branch, the production in the other branch and transport to the requesting branch. It is incorporated via the network edges. For our 2-branch example (see Figure 2 .2), this is reflected by the fact that liquidity can only flow forward in time (see also Assumption 5).
The formal optimization problem for the n-branch bank is sketched in Figure 3 .2. Section 3 discusses the nbranch model including the additional constraints that we incorporated to account for other factors like country risk and diversification. The assumption on the transfer delay significantly changes the properties of our model. Therefore, we discuss the 2-branch model briefly without (deterministic case) and in detail with the delay assumption (stochastic case).
In order to isolate the effects, we make further assumptions for the 2-branch analysis:
(1) The liquidity demand for all branches at all times is zero except for Tokyo end-of-day, i.e., d Immediate liquidity transport (deterministic case). Without a delay, Tokyo can observe the liquidity demand and order all its interbank liquidity in Frankfurt. The decision on the optimal volume is therefore deterministic as in the 1-branch model: x q (T ) * = d. Over-and under-production are zero. The center decision is made by choosing the cheapest setup in terms of expected cost. The optimization problem (2.7) describes the setup "T is Liquidity Center" and the optimal costs amount to
The optimization problem (2.8) describes the setup "T is not a Liquidity Center" and the optimal costs amount to:
Thus, we set up Tokyo as liquidity center, if it holds:
Again we encounter the well-known trade-off between fixed cost and savings in production cost as seen in the 1-branch case with the exception that remote production got more expensive by the transfer cost. However, the critical factor is the expectation of the demand, not its uncertainty (volatility).
Delayed liquidity transport (stochastic case).
With the assumption of a delayed transfer, a new liquidity center changes the uncertainty structure of the bank: a liquidity center not only provides cheap, but also immediate access to interbank liquidity. Now, remote interbank liquidity does not only differ in its price from local interbank liquidity, but also in its information content: it has to be decided before the local demand is known. Therefore, remote production exhibits a new disadvantage: penalty costs due to over-/ under-production via the central bank channel becomes necessary (almost surely). As the liquidity center can reduce uncertainty, the degree of uncertainty (volatility demand) becomes a critical factor for the center decision. We will see that the information on the unexpected demand has a price (price of information) and that there exists a volatility threshold that separates the case of not having a liquidity center in place from the one where it is economically advantageous to setup such a center in a given branch. In particular, it might be favorable to upgrade a branch to a liquidity center although its production cost (after transportation) are substantially higher as this ensures that not only the expected but also the unexpected demand can be produced at interbank cost and not at penalty cost. The savings on penalty cost might outweigh the fixed cost of the center. Note that the expected demand will still be produced in the cheaper node.
To isolate the interplay between liquidity volatility and location decision, we make additional simplifications for the case at hand. Let q ∈ Q denote the set of scenarios, then:
(1) The interbank production cost are the same for all nodes: c q (v) = c for all q ∈ Q. (2) The transportation cost are set to zero: t q (v, w) = 0 for all q ∈ Q and v, w ∈ V . (3) If T is run as a liquidity center, the local production is at cost c. If T is not run as a liquidity center, local production is at p up and p op respectively as only emergency funds at central bank can be accessed. The cost for over-production are p op and the cost for under-production are p up for all nodes v ∈ V and scenarios q ∈ Q. Hence, we split up c N into p op and p up to account for cost asymmetry between overand under-production.
In particular, the decision on the production level in Tokyo at cost c if T is a liquidity center is taken end-of-day after the demand is known, whereas if T is not a liquidity center, it is taken in Frankfurt at T 6/F 6 (cf. Figure  2. 2) as Frankfurt has to produce in advance to compensate for the delay. We will now compare the wait-and-see decision in Tokyo which can be made after the demand is known with the here-and-now decision to be made in Frankfurt prior to the knowledge of the demand in Tokyo, i.e., without complete information. In this sense the liquidity production in Tokyo can be understood as a just-in-time production whereas the production in Frankfurt for Tokyo has to be planned (without complete information).
Let d denote the end-of-day liquidity demand in Tokyo, i.e., d := d(T 12). The objective functions reads as follows:
In case T is not a liquidity center, then the demand has to be satisfied by Frankfurt:
As the decision on the production level x(F ) in Frankfurt for Tokyo is to be decided in advance, d is a random variable with respect to our decision x(F ).
In case T is a liquidity center, then demand can be satisfied by local production in Tokyo just-in-time:
Therefore, d is known whenever we have to decide on x(T ) and thus by producing x(T ) = d the above formula simplifies to
We will now compare the two costs for this specific setup and derive a price on the demand information.
2.1. Volatility as a driver of decentralization. In the following section we will show that volatility indeed drives the degree of decentralization. We will see that having a liquidity center set up can be understood as an option on cheap and just-in-time liquidity. Thus, it provides insurance against unexpected volatility demand and can be considered as a hedge against volatility in liquidity demand. We will illustrate the effects of volatility on decentralization below. More specifically, we compare the here-and-now performance with lack of information to the wait-and-see performance and thus we effectively establish a price/valuation for the missing information. We compare the marginal cost between both scenarios. The costs for the two scenarios are given in (2.10) and (2.12) respectively. Let denote the probability function. We are interested in the expected cost for production level x(F ) in case Frankfurt produces the liquidity for Tokyo, i.e.,
For a given production level x(F ), the expected value of having a liquidity center in place in T is then given by
and thus the value of the position at hand is given by
Note that cost(F ) represents only the variable, volume dependent cost and the fixed cost c f i x are treated separately as this will be our option premium. We assume that p up − c ≥ 0; otherwise there is no incentive to produce local liquidity at all. The combination of these two positions in (2.13) is a classical straddle option strategy with strike x(F ) as depicted in Figure 2 .3. The lines in the figure represent the cost under information certainty, the curve (straddle) the cost under information uncertainty. Cost can only be completely eliminated under certainty. Under uncertainty, cost persists even for the optimal production volume. Thus the cost can be decomposed into a component that the decision maker can minimize by choosing the optimal production volume. The base cost however cannot be eliminated by the optimal production. It can only be eliminated by opening a liquidity center (moving from uncertainty to certainty). We will show this now in detail.
The minimal value of the position is the one obtained for an optimal production level x(F ) * in F as it is reasonable to assume that F is a rational utility maximizer and hence a cost minimizer, i.e., This value can therefore be considered the true value of the position. In the following we will provide an analytical derivation of value[x(F ) * ]. In order to determine the minimum of (2.13) we will use the following lemma. Let Φ denote the cumulative distribution function and φ the probability density function of the standard distribution. 
Similarly we have
Proof. Note that
We therefore obtain ∂
By the definition of φ we have
The second equality follows similarly.
Using Lemma 2.1 we obtain the value of the straddle position and the optimal production level: Proof. As we want to determine the optimal solution x * we have to solve
This establishes that the optimal percentile z * = Φ(
op + c we therefore obtain that for our specific example the optimal production level x(F ) * is given by
We will now relate the straddle position to the expected shortfall to finally valuate our position: Lemma 2.3. Let η be a normally distributed random variable with mean µ and standard deviation σ. Then
and similarly,
Proof. Observe that
Together with Lemma 2.1 we obtain
and the result follows. The second equality follows mutatis mutandis.
Observe that the term [η | η ≥ x] corresponds to the expected value of η given that it exceeds x which is equivalent to the expected shortfall for the level x. For a normally distributed random variable η the expected shortfall has a particularly nice form:
[see e.g., [7] ] Let η be a normally distributed random variable with mean µ and standard deviation
We will now combine Lemma 2.4 and Lemma 2.3: Corollary 2.5. Let η be a normally distributed random variable with mean µ and standard deviation σ. Then
Using Corollary 2.5 we can valuate our straddle position
and after rewriting and ordering terms we obtain
with two summands that have a particularly nice economic interpretation. The first summand is the part that can be hedged by the rational cost minimizer and is proportional to the first derivative of value[x(F )]. By the choice of x(F ) * we thus have 
And so it pays off to set up T as a liquidity center if (2.15) holds:
In the setting at hand we assumed that d is a normally distributed random variable and therefore we obtain in this particular case:
It is important to note that the price of information is linear in σ in this case and thus the unit price of information
, establishing relation between volatility and the degree decentralization. Further it is independent of the actual volume to be transferred.
In Figure 2 .4 value[x(F )] is depicted for a fixed σ and 2p up = p op . The price of information is obtained for z * ≈ 80%. As expected, the optimal production level is located to the right of the 50%-percentile of d as being liquidity short is more expensive then being liquidity long. Clearly, c f i x and value[x(F ) * ] have to be considered for the same time horizon, i.e., if we calculate the value of the option on a time horizon of a year, we also have to break down the fixed costs c f i x to the same horizon.
THE n-BRANCH MODEL
We will now formulate the liquidity center location problem as an optimization problem which can be solved using mixed-integer programming techniques (see e.g., [29, 34] ). We first introduce the necessary preliminaries. Preliminaries. The formulation of the liquidity center location problem will be based on two common problem types in operations research and optimization. We will use network flow and facility location problems in order to model our problem at hand. An extended discussion of these problems can be found in [34, 29] .
Network flow problems. The first problem type is the network flow problem. Given a directed graph G = (V, E), we can transfer units of flow from v ∈ V to w ∈ V if (v, w) ∈ E. Such a network is depicted in Figure 3 .1. We are in particular interested in the case where we can generate flow in every node v ∈ V with cost c(v) per unit of flow and we have a flow demand d(v) for every node v ∈ V . Moreover, we have transportation cost t(v, w) for every edge (v, w) ∈ E that are incurred whenever we transfer a unit of flow from v to w.
The objective is to produce flow with minimal cost so that all demands are met, i.e.:
The variables x(v) with v ∈ V are the (non-negative) production variables and the variables f (v, w) with (v, w) ∈ E are the (non-negative) flow variables. In the absence of indivisibilities this problem can be solved efficiently using linear programming.
Facility location problems. The second type of problem is the (uncapacitated) facility location problem. Suppose we have m customers := {C 1 , . . . , C m } that we have to supply with a certain good and k potential locations for factories := {F 1 , . . . , F k } that could be the potential supplier. For each pair (F i , C j ) (with 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ m) we have a certain cost to ship the good from factory F i to customer C j which we denote by t(i, j). This problem can be understood as given on a bipartite graph G = ( ∪ , E) with (C, F ) ∈ E if and only if C ∈ and F ∈ . If the only constraint is that every customer demand has to satisfied, we assign each customer C j to factory F i with t(i, j) minimal and thus obtain an overall optimal solution. Unfortunately, building and operating a factory incurs additional costs (i.e., staff, infrastructure, etc). Thus we are interested in a trade-off between operational costs for the factories and shipping costs. Let c f i x be the fixed cost for operating a factory, let d j denote the demand for customer C j with 1 ≤ j ≤ m, and let M be the maximal demand in our instance. Then we can formulate the problem as follows:
The variables b(i) are binary decision variables, i.e., either 0 or 1 that indicate if factory F i is has been built. The variables f (i, j) with 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ m are the (non-negative) flow variables and indicate the amount that has been shipped from factory i to customer j. This problem is harder to solve in general due to the decision variables b(i), but can be tackled for reasonable sizes with state-of-the-art mixed integer programming solvers.
3.2.
The liquidity center location problem. We are now ready to cast the sketched liquidity center location problem in terms of an optimization problem. Note that the simplifying assumptions made in the 2-branch section are relaxed here. In particular, demands are not forced to zero. Furthermore, the demand is distributed according to the chosen scenarios. In particular, it is not necessarily normally distributed as assumed before. No branch is predefined as liquidity center. The interbank production cost are node-specific and transportation cost are not necessarily zero.
We use a network flow model to distribute liquidity across the different locations. The decision to open a liquidity center or not adds a facility location aspect to the problem at hand (see Section 3.1). Our formulation uses a very limited number of integer variables making even large instances accessible to solvers that are available today. In fact we have one binary variable for each potential liquidity center.
Let B = {b 1 , . . . , b n } denote the set of branches and let T be a discretization of the 24 hour horizon, e.g., T = {0, 6, 12, 18, 24}. We consider the time-expansion of B by T and consider V ⊆ B × T where we add only nodes according to the active times of the branches. Thus each node that we consider is a (location,time) pair. In view of our example the node F 18 would correspond to Frankfurt at 6pm with respect to an arbitrary but fixed chosen local time. We further define the set of edges E to be given by ((v, g), (w, h)) ∈ E :⇔ v = w available and g is the immediate predecessor of h v = w both available and g + τ ≤ h (+ extra requirements) ,
where τ is the delay due to remote liquidity production. The extra requirements could be, e.g., some additional requirements regarding the stability of the payment system. Effectively, the definition of the edge set E allows for determining which branch in the branch network is allowed to transfer liquidity to which other branch and and pen up,q (v) with v ∈ V measure the over-production and under-production respectively and are thus scenariodependent with q ∈ Q. We have three types of constraints in our model. Constraint (3.1) is the flow equality that enforces that a demand d q (v) has to be covered by local production and inflow minus outflow. The difference is the over-/under-production. In Constraint (3.2) we account for the country risk which ultimately might affect the success probability of a transfer. We thus enforce certain transport limits, i.e., liquidity inflow from a remote location v with a high country risk and hence concentration risk must not cover more than cr(v) percent of the demand. This constraint also ensures a certain diversification. The third condition, Constraint (3.3), ensures that we can only generate cheap liquidity in a branch b if it is indeed a liquidity center.
3.3. Stochasticity. To this end we decided to focus on stochastic demand. It is perfectly possible though to further extend the model to include more stochastic parameters or declare certain decision variables scenariodependent. One candidate for such a change could be the country risk that could be argued to depend significantly on the scenario considered. Another potential candidate could be the costs for over-and under-production with a similar argumentation.
3.4.
Recovering the option prices and economic interpretation. Given a liquidity center setup C ⊆ B we can compute the marginal price of information for each branch b 0 ∈ B \ C in the following way. We first compute the optimal solution to the liquidity center location problem (see Figure 3 .2) and we obtain the optimal liquidity center locations (l(b)) b∈B . Let cost * denote the optimal objective function value. For every b ∈ B with l(b) = 1, we fix this variable to 1, i.e., we add a constraint of the form l(b) = 1 to our optimization problem. Further we add a constraint l(b 0 ) = 1 , i.e., we force the liquidity center to be set up. Note, that we confine ourselves to the case b 0 ∈ B \ C; the case that b 0 ∈ C follows analogously by adding the constraint l(b 0 ) = 0 and performing the same computation. Now we solve the augmented model again and obtain an optimal objective function value cost for the augmented model. Let the difference of the two values be denoted by :=cost − cost * . It holds,
As cost * was the objective function value of the overall optimal solution without fixing certain variables we have cost − cost * ≥ 0. On the other hand observe that just adding b 0 to the network without any production assigned we obtain a solution whose objective function value is no worth than cost * + c f i x (b 0 ). Now, if the optimal objective function value for the augmented optimization problem satisfies cost < cost * + c f i x (b 0 ) the additional value generated from setting up b 0 , i.e., the marginal price of information for the configuration C is given by
When dealing with linear optimization problems (without integer variables)
is well approximated by the reduced cost of the variable l(b 0 ). The decision of setting up a liquidity center or not is a binary one though and so we have to solve the two optimization problems separately and compare the objective function value. Nonetheless, the solver uses the reduced cost information to decide which location can appear in the optimal location assignment. In particular if we have Once an optimal location arrangement is chosen, the optimization problem simplifies to a linear program. In this case we have the full duality theory available and obtain marginal prices for the demand in any node v ∈ V . The dual prices for the flow equalities (cf. (3.1)) provide the cost for an additional unit of demand on average (for a given node v ∈ V ). Further we can extract the cost of concentration risk from inequalities (3.2) and the associated dual prices.
3.5. Supermodular cost structure. In the n-branch model, possible decisions are not just those of setting up an additional liquidity center but also decisions of the either-or-type, e.g., setting up liquidity centers in either locations A, B, and C or in locations X and Y . These decisions could still be valuated in an option framework, but determining the value is more complicated. Further the overall structure of the problem changes as now the value of the option is contingent on the number or liquidity centers already in place. More specifically we have a supermodular cost structure: Say we have C 1 ⊆ C 2 ⊆ B where B is the set of branches and the branches in C 1 and C 2 have been set up as liquidity center. Further let b ∈ B \ C 2 , i.e., a branch that has not yet been set up as a liquidity center. Then it holds
as the liquidity center b added to the large network C 2 might generate less savings than when added to a smaller network C 1 although the fixed cost is identical in both cases. Therefore when considering a branch network the law of diminishing returns (also referred to as the diseconomies of scale) holds and thus we have to consider the marginal price of information for a specific configuration at hand. Due to that specific cost structure there is a natural saturation on the number of liquidity setups.
3.6. Scenario generation. An important aspect when dealing with stochastic models where the stochastic behavior is introduced via scenarios is the actual generation of scenarios. Similar to the calculation of potential future exposure for trading positions via a Monte-Carlo approach, the actual choice of the scenarios can (and usually does) affect the solution of the optimization problem. The generated scenarios should reflect the risk appetite of the bank and should be consistent with liquidity stress testing scenarios. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) wrote [16] :
Bank managers must focus on adequate liquidity during both normal times and times of stress. Liquidity managers are rightly concerned with profitable, efficient operations in normal economic environments. The best managers use scenario analysis to balance the inverse relationship between liquidity and earnings during good times, but will also spend time evaluating the
FIGURE 4.1. Deterministic formulation for normally distributed demand impact of stressful, low-probability liquidity events. When evaluating liquidity risk and isolating the liquidity component rating, examiners are primarily concerned with the risk management information derived from management's evaluation of more extreme liquidity scenarios. We do not want to further address the scenario generation. A scenario reduction approach for stochastic programming that approximates the potentially large amount of (stress testing) scenarios can be found in [20, 14] .
A DETERMINISTIC FORMULATION OF THE N -BRANCH MODEL FOR NORMALLY DISTRIBUTED DEMAND
In this section we want to consider the special case that all demands are normally distributed and all the other parameters are deterministic. We further assume that the demands are independent and the actual production costs c(v) = c for some c is identical for all v ∈ V . Under these assumptions we can use the price of information directly to obtain a deterministic model that is equivalent to the stochastic model presented in Section 3.2. Let P I(v) be the price of information (cf. (2.16)) and further let P L(v) denote optimal amount of remote liquidity requested (cf. Proposition 2.2) for each node v ∈ V . With the notation from Section 3.2 we can formulate a deterministic model as specified in Figure 4 .1. Note that we do not have any scenario dependency in this deterministic model.
It is easy to verify that the formulation does indeed describe the optimal configuration. For any given node v ∈ V with demand d(v) the optimal production level of remote liquidity P L(v) is obtained by Proposition 2.2. In Constraint (4.1) we require that at least this amount is the net inflow into v given that v (or more specifically the associated b) is not set up as a liquidity center. If v ∈ V is setup as a liquidity center, then we require that we produce at least the expected demand [d(v)] but potentially more as we might produce liquidity for other nodes as well. The objective function slightly changes as well, as we now (exclusively) either pay the fixed cost for a branch b ∈ B to set it up as a liquidity center or we pay the price of information P I(v) for each associated v ∈ V which is the expected extra cost for not having a liquidity center in place.
This approach is a convenient way to remove scenario dependency from the model given that the underlying variables are independent and normally distributed. It would be interesting to consider this approach for generic n-stage stochastic programming with simple recourse provided that the variables are normally distributed or the distributions admit a closed form solution for the price of information. This section discusses computational results for the n-branch models presented in Section 3 and 4. In order to verify the correctness of the n-branch formulation we performed several tests, one of which was the comparison to the analytical 2-branch model of Section 2. Implementing the simplifications for the 2-branch model for a suitable number of approximation scenarios of the normal distribution, the n-branch and the analytical 2-branch model generate identical results with negligible errors (see Figure 5 .1).
For the demonstration of the effect of volatility we devised an exemplary 10-branch instance. Details on the parameters and their description are summarized in Table 1 . We distinguish external and internal parameters depending whether their calibration is based on market (external) or bank (internal) estimates. Note that our parameter structure is rich as it covers the following dimensions:
(1) FX-and operational risk (via transportation cost) (2) Country risk (via transportation cost) (3) Concentration risk (4) Over-/ and under-production (5) Different interbank market conditions We strongly believe that these components have to constitute the minimal requirements for any reasonable cost structure when dealing with liquidity center location decisions. A more differentiated cost structure accounting for more risk drivers is recommended for all real world applications. We are currently cooperating with a bank to obtain the necessary cost information to create a more sophisticated cost structure for a specific bank and its branch network. Its analysis will be subject to an upcoming article.
For a 10-branch instance, the number of parameters is already large: For each node, we have 10 x 7 parameters for c f i x (v), c(v), etc. according to Tokyo  1  2  2  1  1  2  2  1  1  Singapore  1  2  1  1  1  2  2  1  1  Dubai  1  3  1  1  1  2  3  2  2  Frankfurt  2  1  2  1  1  2  1  1  1  Brussels  2  2  2  1  1  2  1  1  1  London  2  1  3  1  1  2  1  1  1  Zurich  2  1  3  1  1  2  1  1  1  Sao Paulo  3  3  1  1  1  2  3  3  3  New York  3  1  3  1  1  2  1  1  1  Toronto  3  2  2  1  1  2  1  1  1   TABLE 2 . 10-branch model categorized parameters matrix). In order to keep things tractable, we assign categories to parameters in a first step. The categories are mapped to numerical values in a second step. The parameter categories for each branch are shown by table 2. In general, category 1 corresponds to low cost, category 2 to medium and category 3 to high cost. Similarly for the demand we have category 1 for low demand, 2 for medium, and 3 for high demand. With respect to time zones, 1 refers to the 0/12-, 2 to the 6/18-and 3 to the 12/24-slot on the world time grid (see bottom of Figure  5 .2). The time zones are chosen according to the geography of the location. The categories have been assigned based on their proxies or by expert judgement.
The second step, i.e. the mapping of these categories to numerical values can be found in the appendix.
5.1. The effects of volatility. The base case with low volatility leads to one liquidity center, Frankfurt, (depicted in yellow) and the remaining branches get their liquidity from Frankfurt (see Figure 5 .2). The actual optimization model can be separated into two parts: a deterministic and a stochastic one. The deterministic component optimizes the production of expected demand based on the well-known trade-offs of fixed cost on the one hand and production and transportation cost on the other hand. A branch with low production cost, low fixed cost and low transportation cost will serve as global producer and distributor. If a branch has an advantage in production but not in fixed cost/ transportation cost, it depends on the volume whether this branch or another with an advantage in fixed cost and/or variable cost (production + transportation) will be set up as liquidity center (Mechanism 1). High transportation cost favor the autonomy of branches, i.e., the network decomposes into a network of stand-alone branches (Mechanism 2). Apart from these basic trade-offs we also incorporate a time zone aspect: as the branches of time zone 1 and 3 do not overlap in terms of availability, in case of an overall setup with only one global center, this one must be in time zone 2 (Mechanism 3). The stochastic part of our model favors the set up of liquidity centers if liquidity uncertainty increases due to increased volatility or if the liquidity uncertainty costs (price of information) increase due to the increasing penalty cost for over-and underproduction (Mechanism 4).
Due to the high expected demand (500.000) in the base case, the production cost is a key parameter. Frankfurt, London, Zurich, and New York can produce at low cost (category 1) and are thus candidates for liquidity centers (Mechanism 1). As all four candidates have the same transportation cost but Frankfurt has an advantage in fixed cost, Frankfurt operates as a liquidity center and produces the major demand in liquidity and the branches cover the remaining just-in-time demand via the central bank. If the branch with the production and fixed cost advantage would be in time zone 3 (e.g., the New York branch), New York would operate as a liquidity center, but also the most profitable branch in time zone 1 would have to be opened as New York cannot produce (without overnight-roll over) for time zone 1. The branches Dubai and Sao Paulo suffer from high transportation cost (Currency/ Corruption/ Transfer Limits: Dubai (3/2/2) and Sao Paulo (3/3/3)). Nonetheless, they are not set up as liquidity centers and do not produce their own liquidity as their interbank markets are small implying high local production cost (category 3).
The base case is almost deterministic as the demand volatilities are far below the break even volatility (see condition (2.15) ). If the volatility increases, remote production becomes more expensive due to the increased expected penalty cost; the price of information increases. We assume that the volatility in Zurich, London, Brussels, and New York increases to 200.000 (Mechanism 4). Now it is economically advantageous to run Frankfurt, but also Zurich, London, and New York as liquidity centers (cf. Figure 5. 3) Although, Brussels for examples faces the same uncertainty, it is not set up as a liquidity center as it has a higher break even volatility due to its increased interbank market production cost (category 2). Hence, the relative advantage to produce Further increasing volatility and/or penalty cost might successively lead to setting up more and more locations as liquidity centers as indicated in Figure 5 .4. Thus, our model captures the well-known mechanism of the deterministic component, but also successfully incorporates the component arising from stochastic liquidity demand. External parameters can be estimated from market data via proxies. The data on the demand though has to be provided by the bank. It is imperative that banks estimate the distribution function of the demands and in particular the demand volatility in each branch; estimating only the expected demand neglects volatility as an important key factor for the center allocation.
Computational feasibility.
One of the challenges is the numerical instability that might arise in some cases as the order of magnitudes of the volumes to be transferred (billions) and the production cost (basis points) might differ significantly. Thus the big-M formulations might behave numerically unstable. For our computational feasibility tests we mainly used the commercial solver CPLEX 11. those obtained by using Gurobi 1.1.1 [19] , and the non-commercial scip 1.1.0 [2] , all of which are state-of-theart mixed integer linear programming solvers. With all three solvers optimal or near-optimal solutions can be obtained within a short amount of time and the solution process was numerically stable. We report the timings for the runs performed with CPLEX 11.1.0. In Table 3 we provide timings for solving the model from Section 3 for various sizes. We vary the number of branches in the network as well as the number of scenarios. For the scenarios we decided to provide timings for a rather coarse approximation with 4 scenarios only which can be solved very fast and for 100 scenarios which allow for a sufficiently fine model of the stochastic demand structure. The instances for each (network size, branch size) combination were generated according to a cost structure similar to the one in Section 5 and we generated different cost mappings and scenarios randomly. We would like to point out that due to the imposed cost structure the actual instances are not random instances: we randomly generate the costs and spreads from a distribution and vary the category keys; the overall cost structure is preserved. For each instance set group we generated 10 instances. In all cases an optimal solution can be computed in less than 1 minute and the standard deviation is small. One particularity that we observed is that indeed the geometric mean of the solution times for the 50 nodes was higher than the for 60 nodes model. This was due to one instance in the 50 nodes instance set which had a higher overall solution time of 59.58 seconds.
In Table 4 we provide timings for instances with 60 nodes for the model from Section 4. Each instance group consisted of 10 instances. As expected, the model can be solved extremely fast to optimality even for large instances. In all cases the solution times were below 2 seconds and an optimal assignment could be computed. We report geometric means and the standard deviations in the table.
CONCLUSION
Our paper studies how to optimize the liquidity production in a global banking group. More precisely we ask whether liquidity should be produced in one (central) branch, in several regional ones or (locally) in each branch. This question naturally translates into a two-stage optimization problem: the first-stage decision is an organizational one: which branches should be extended to liquidity centers with direct access to cheap interbank liquidity (and requiring fixed cost) and which branches should be run as simple branches with expensive central bank access only? The second-stage decision is an operational one: once the organizational setup is fixed the optimal production and transport volumes have to be decided. We are primarily interested in the organizational decision that trades off the marginal cost (fixed cost) against its marginal benefits. The stochastic driver of the model is the liquidity demand in each branch. The problem is formulated as a Mixed Integer Program and solved accordingly.
In Section 2 we confirm that in the 1-branch bank the determining factor to run a liquidity center is the expected liquidity demand. This reflects the well-known trade-off between fixed cost and the saving on (variable) production cost.
However, we want to study banking groups. To study the key mechanics of our model, we started with the smallest possible banking group, the 2-branch group. We assume that (interbank) liquidity can be exchanged between branches. This implies additional transportation cost and a time delay. The time delay introduces an informational dimension to our model: a liquidity center does not only provide cheaper, but also immediate access to liquidity (via interbank). A non-center branch must order its interbank liquidity from a center branch before knowing the exact liquidity demand. Any over-/ under-production must be locally invested/ produced at unattractive central bank rates. We interpret these cost as penalty cost. As a liquidity center is effectively a vehicle to resolve information uncertainty we define the cost differential between center/ non-center as price of information. We show that the price of information increases with the demand uncertainty (volatility). In contrast to the 1-node branch, the volatility is the driving factor behind the decision of opening a liquidity center. We derive a threshold volatility beyond which the branch should be extended to a liquidity center as the avoidance of penalty cost outweighs the fixed cost. Hence, fixed cost are traded-off against penalty cost (volatility). The center opening only saves cost on the production quantity that is decided after the demand realizes (e.g., peak productions). This implies that production quantity that has been decided before (e.g. the expected part of the demand) is not traded-off against fixed cost. Where this quantity is produced depends on the trade-off remote production cost (i.e., production of other node + transportation cost) versus local production cost. We might therefore see the opening of liquidity centers although they have absolute disadvantages in local interbank production (even after transportation cost) compared to other centers. The rationale for these centers is not the production of expected portions of liquidity demand, but of (unexpected) peaks. The expected portions are remotely produced at centers with more attractive interbank rates. We also show that it is the delay assumption that makes volatility an important factor in the center decision. Without delay, a center does not reduce uncertainty and therefore the production decision is made under certainty implying that the expectation of the demand, but not its volatility is the key driver for the center decision.
After having studied the volatility effect in the 2-branch model, we extended the model to a n-branch model in two formulations: scenario-based (Section 3) and as a deterministic formulation (Section 4).
Section 5 demonstrated the applicability of the model to real world problems. In contrast to our (pathological) 2-branch model, all factors came into play: different fixed cost, transportation cost, production cost, and demand volatilities. We used a 10-branch model to explain the interplay of these factors. In particular, we identified low production cost as a centralization factor, high transportation and penalty cost, time zones and demand volatility as decentralization factors. In order to study the computational feasibility, we investigated the performance for several network sizes (10 -60 branches) and granularities (4 to 100 scenarios). We can state that even models of large banking groups (60 branches) and of high granularity (100 scenarios) can be solved in less than 30 seconds using the commercial solver CPLEX 11.1.0. As expected, the deterministic formulation can be solved much quicker: for large banking groups (60 branches) within a second.
Hence, Section 5 demonstrates that the implementation challenge is not computation, but calibration. More precisely, a bank must estimate the interbank production, transportation, penalty and fixed cost for each branch/ market. Apart from these exogenous cost, it has to estimate the demand distribution for each branch.
Our model can be extended in several ways. First, the current model horizon of one business day should be extended to several days with daily (second-stage) volume decisions. Such a multi-period model is able to capture the different holiday and weekend calenders of financial centers as well as seasonal patterns of liquidity demand. Second, it is interesting to study the impact of a stochastic cost structure on the center decision. Market turmoils usually translate in both large liquidity demands and higher (production, transportation, penalty) cost. As fixed cost are scenario-invariant, we expect that a positive correlation between cost and demand favors decentralized setups. Third, the current objective function describes a risk-neutral banking group whereas existing banking groups are risk-averse. Hence, the incorporation of a risk measure in the objective function would make the analysis more realistic. Finally, our model does not explicitly capture liquidity constraints resulting from monetary policy (e.g. minimum reserves) or from regulatory liquidity models (e.g. minimum liquidity buffers). The consideration of these real-world constraints might provide further insight how a large banking group should organize their liquidity production.
APPENDIX
Within Section 5 we used categories for the model parameters. Table 5 shows the values that we assigned to the categories and references that we consulted for indicative figures. The interbank production rates refer to the average funding cost that a bank has to pay overnight. Category 1 refers to a large interbank market with production cost of 50 bps. The smaller the interbank market (lower liquidity), the higher are the funding rates. Therefore, we assume additional spreads of 100 bps and 200 bps for a medium and a small interbank market respectively.
The fixed cost are the volume-independent cost to setup a liquidity center (salaries, rent, systems). We assume that the annual cost in a branch with low salaries, low rents and low system cost is around 18.000 monetary units (e.g. Sao Paulo), 108.000 for a medium (e.g. Brussels) and 360.000 for an expensive location (e.g. New York).
The underproduction cost are the rates to raise liquidity at the central bank overnight. Again, the central bank rates vary according to (central bank) sizes. We assume that 2.00 % are to be paid in a large, 3.00 % in a medium and 6.00% in a small central bank (market). Note that the underproduction cost must be higher than the interbank rates as interbank rates are considered to be one of the benefits of a liquidity center. If the underproduction cost were lower than the interbank rates, there is no rationale to open a liquidity center as cheap and immediate funds can be produced at the central bank.
The over-production cost measure the opportunity cost for liquid assets that are not used for liquidity production. We assume that they are of 0.50% for large, 1.00% for medium and 3.50% for small interbank markets.
In order to neutralize the effects of expected demand, we set the expected demand constant across all categories and only varied the demand uncertainty (volatility). We assume that a stable liquidity demand has a standard deviation of 2000, a medium volatile one of 50000 and an unstable of 200000 units overnight.
Transportation cost have two components: FX-conversion cost and cost that reflect the country risk. Country risk summarizes corruption and credit risk of the country. To each branch we assigned a currency liquidity and corruption category. As proxy for the currency liquidity we used bid-ask spreads. We assumed for liquid currencies 3 bps, for medium 13 bps and for illiquid currencies around 300 bps. For low risk-countries, we assume 0%, for medium risk-countries 2% and for high risk-countries 5%. We used the corruption index as an indication. However, the figures are ad hoc assumptions.
The transportation cost for a transport between branch w and branch v are the sum of liquidity currency of w plus v and the country risk spreads for w plus v.
The transfer limits are introduced to capture the risk of technical failure of a branch. Such failures would have a high impact if liquidity production was based in one single node even if it is optimal from a cost perspective.
